Mixed oligopoly with consumer-friendly public firms

We consider a mixed oligopoly with a public firm that maximizes the sum of its own profits and consumers' surplus. We characterize the unique pure strategy equilibrium and show that as long as the cost function is not ``too concave'', privatization reduces welfare. We find that while the first best cannot be implemented using a tax/subsidy policy that is the same for all firms, a budget-balancing policy that involves a tax on the public firm, coupled with subsidies to the private firms, can do so. Further, the optimal tax/subsidy policy is critically dependent on whether there is privatization or not.Mixed oligopoly; public firms; subsidy; tax; irrelevance principle; privatization

Group-lending with sequential financing, contingent renewal and social capital

This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of group-lending, in particular sequential financing and contingent renewal. We examine the encacy of these two schemes in harnessing social capital. We find that, for the appropriate parameter configurations, there is homogenous group-formation so that the lender can ascertain the identity of a group without lending to all its members, thus screening out bad borrowers partially. Moreover, under certain parameter configurations, negative assortative matching occurs as a robust phenomenon.Group-lending, sequential financing, contingent renewal, social capital, assortative matching

Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.Auctions; ceilings; collusion; reserve prices

Bertrand Competition with Non-rigid Capacity Constraints

We examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional cost, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the number of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases.

Patents and R & D: The tournament effect

We identify a new route through which patent protection may affect R&D incentives, the tournament effect. It may decrease R\&D incentives, in which case patent protection may either adversely affect the level of R&D, or may discourage licensing. In either case welfare may fall.Patents, R&D incentive, Tournament effect, Licensing

Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability

We develop a simple model of group-lendingbased on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring, group-lending schemes may involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects. Moreover, under certain parameter configurations, group-lending schemes involving either sequential financing, or a combination of lender monitoringand joint liability are feasible. In fact, group-lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability, though the repayment rate will be lower. In the absence of joint liability, however, group-lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible.Group-lending, joint liability, peer monitoring, sequential financing, under-monitoring, lender monitoring

Joint venture instability: a life cycle approach

Joint ventures represent one of the most fascinating developments in international business. In the last few decades, the rate of joint venture formation has accelerated dramatically. Nowadays joint ventures are much more widespread and occur in industries like telecommunications, biotechnology etc. At the same time, however, it must be noted that joint ventures are very unstable. In this paper we survey the phenomenon of joint venture instability. We draw on the relative recent theoretical literature on joint venture instability to provide a unified explanation of joint venture life-cycles, formation, as well as breakdown. Further, we do this for both research oriented, as well as production joint ventures.Joint ventures; formation; breakdown; synergy; moral hazard; learning

Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints

We examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional per unit cost of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as [a] the number of firms becomes large and [b] the capacity cost increases.Bertrand competition, capacity constraint

Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price set at the lowest bidder valuation.Auctions, ceilings, collusion, reserve prices

Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms

We examine a model of price competition where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity, and are free to supply less than the quantity demanded. We demonstrate that if the tie-breaking rule is `non-manipulable', then, for a large class of rationing rules, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever the number of firms is large enough. We then show that the `folk theorem' of perfect competition holds. Finally, we examine if the results go through when the firms are asymmetric, or produce to order.Bertrand equilibrium, pure strategy, non-manipulable tiebreaking rule